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Psycholo gical Warfare, Japan

Psychological Warfar e, Japan
Japanese psychological warfare operations were modeled
on campaign s conducte d by the British in World War I
and rhe Germans in World War II. The Germans estabda ministry 1'n Ja pan,
a branch . of rheir propaaan
lished
b
.
wh1ch resulted m close psychological warfare collaboration berween these rwo Axis powers. As a result, their
propagan da themes, such as borh nations having divine
or semidivin e rulers and being populated by super races
whose destiny was to rule rhe world, were strikingly
parallel.
Psychological warfare served four general goals of the
Japanese war effort: to weaken and destroy the morale of
the Western powers, to encourage the resistance of
friendly forces in territories occupied by the Western powers, to promote dissension berween Western government/
military forces and their home fronts and allies, and to
keep neutrals neutral or to procure their active cooperation against the West. The Japanese conducted three general forms of psychological warfare, which were primarily
coordina ted by the Cabinet Informati on Board. However,
rhe headquar ters of the Japanese army remained autonomous and conducte d its own psychological operations.
Strategic propagan da was directed against the home
fronts, political leadership, and status of the Western powers in Asia. The Japanese had defied these Western powers
by invading rhe Chinese territory of Manchuri a in 1931
and, as a result, gained a powerful psychological advantage
over them. They capitalized upon it with the slogan "Asia
for rhe Asiatics." Although most of the Japanese leadership, both political and military, seemed sincerely to believe in the slogan's sentiment s, it was nonetheless used
as a pretext for Japan's policy of military expansion. Japan's intent was to be viewed as rhe liberator of the Asia ric
peoples and to show that the rule of the Western powers
in Asia was now over.
In the decade preceding their surprise anack on Pearl
Harbor, Hawaii, on Decembe r 7, 1941, the Japanese
preyed upon rhe split in American public opinion berween isolationi sts and interventionists to further their
policies. Ambiguit y, threats, and promises of goodwill
were elevated to an art form. These made possible the
continue d provision of strategic resources such as fuel oil
and scrap iron ro the Japanese economy, as well as the
secret fortificati on of the islands mandated to Japan by
the League of Nations.
Operatio nal and tactical propagan da were direcre~
against the military forces of the Western powers. In th1s
regard Pearl Harbor a master stroke at the operational
level, bur at the same rime it was, was a strategic blunder
that utterly destroyed ten years of psychological opera-
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tions directed toward the United States. Their belief rhar
the "decaden t" Americans would crumple at the first blow
and meekly turn over most of the Pacific to Japan shows
that the Japanese were every bit as "racist" as the
Americans.
Operation al and tactical Japanese psychological warfare included rhe broadcasts made by Radio Tokyo, especially those of Tokyo Rose, and the dropping of propaganda leaflets. An example of the latter is rhe depiction
of an Aussie soldier fighting in New Guinea while an
American soldier ral<es liberties with an Australian girl
back home. Japanese leaflets directed at U.S. troops invariably depicted the Americans clad in World War Isryle uniforms, complete with "soup bowl" helmets,
equipmen t nor seen in that army since the fall of rhe
Phi lippines. The iconograp hy was usually Oriental and
the "English " rexr fractured. American troops eagerly
gathered such efforts and traded them like baseball or
bubble-gum cards, nor for their "political" content but
for their graphic pornogra phy and hilarious texts. Surrender appeals ("You will be u·eared in accordance wirh rhe
principles of Bush do") were unlikely to have much appeal
to troops who knew about the Baraan death march and
rhe torture-m urders of captured An1ericans on Guadalcanal.
Allied naval personnel were amused by Tokyo Rose's
crocodile tears shed for "rhe poor boys on rhe
_ _ _ _ _ , sunk last night by our brave submariners." The "poor boys," as likely as not, were enjoying the broadcast aboard rhe warship supposed ly resting
on the bottom. On the other hand, Radio Tokyo broadcasters, possibly borrowin g a leaf from the Germans, did
have rhe wit to broadcast the latest American popular
music. Jazz, big band, bebop, jinerbug -rhe latest
Tommy Dorsey or Glen Miller or Bing Crosby
recording s-could be heard on Axis radio well before Allied broadcasts dissemina ted them. Bur U.S. sailors were
so immune to the political blandishm ents of rhe likes of
Tokyo Rose that such enemy broadcasts were actually
piped through the public address systems of Pacific Fleer
ships, both for the humor and for the sailors to catch up
on the Ia rest stateside hits. Japanese tactical psywar against
Allied troops must be judged a complete failure. Nowhere
has rhere been such great listenership with so little result.
Propagan da directed toward conquere d Asian peoples
formed the basis for the creation of Japan's envisioned
Greater East Asian Co-Prosp erity Sphere. All traces of
former Western rule were to be eliminate d in the regions
rhe Japanese occupied. The Japanese occupiers forbade
listening to Al lied broadcasts, introduce d pro-Japan ese
textbooks, replaced European language courses with Jap-
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anese courses, and trained local proteges for admini strative positions. Toward the end of the war such propaganda shifted away from promot ing Japanese language
and culrure co creating feelings of anticolonial nationa lism, in an attemp t co prevent the Western powers from
taking back their former colonies.
The staged spectacle of the once lordly white rulers
being forced by their Japanese conque rors co sweep the
srreets of Singapore was someth ing not co be forgotte n by
Asian nationalists. The Japanese had staged what Communists termed "the propaga nda of the deed" ; they had
completely outfoug ht the British, the French, the Dutch,
and the Americans in a fair fight, using the most modern
weapons of Asian manufa cture. Even the often bestial behavior of occupy ing Japanese troops could nor oblitera te
such considerations. When rhe colonial powers returne d
in 1945, rhey found a change d Asia that would no longer
rolerare foreign colonial overlordship. This was the one
undoub ted success of Japanese psychological warfare in
World War II .
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Psychological Warfa re, U.S.
Psychological warfare, as defined by the U.S. joint chiefs
of staff during World War II, consisted of the integrated
use of all means, moral and physic al-othe r than those
of recognized military actions -that would rend to destroy the will of the enemy and to damage his political
and econom ic capacity; that also would rend to deprive
the enemy of the support , assistance, or sympathy of his
allies or associates or neutrals; or that would rend co mainrain, increase, or acquire the support , assistance, and sympathy of neutrals. By 1944 the broader generic term "psy-

chological warfare," and the older and more specific terms
"comba t propag anda" and "propa ganda, " had become
virtuall y interch angeab le. (There was also some feeling
char "propag anda" had been in bad odor as a result of the
work of rhe Nazi propag anda chief, Paul Joseph Goebbels
'
a man who could give lying a bad name .)
When properl y applied , psycho logical warfare supposedly could bolster morale in one's own forces while so
underm ining an enemy's fighting spirit that collapse could
occur within the first hours of hostilit ies. Psychological
warfare could underm ine the enemy's morale and destroy
irs will to resist, both on the main line of resistance and
on rhe home front. It could destroy alliances, cause civil
disorder, divide officers from the enlisted ranks and citizens from their leaders, and create chaos in the enemy's
homela nd. Psychological warfare require d less in terms of
personnel than did traditio nal armed forces, it could enhance the effectiveness of conven tional weapon s, and it
could provide the final push to an already demoralized
enemy. In short, its ad11erents claimed , psychological warfare could shorten wars, save both money and lives, and
decrease rhe overall level of violenc e.
Psychological warfare was broadly divided into three
interde penden t classes during World War II: strategic, raetical, and consoli dation. Strateg ic propag anda was directed co enemy and enemy- occupie d countri es, and had
rhe double task of underm ining the will to resist and susraining rhe morale of those suppor ting the Allies over the
long term. Tactical or combat propag anda was conducted
against enemy forces in the forward areas and sought very
specific, short-te rm goals. Consol idation propag anda was
directed toward civilians in rear areas or areas recently
occupie d by Allied troops, to ensure their cooperation.
The weapons of psychological warfare were those of
the civilian media in film, print, or audio form. During
World War II, the armed forces relied primari ly on rhe
printed leaflet, newspaper, or news sheet. More than eight
billion leaflets were droppe d by aircraft or delivered by
artillery shells worldw ide by the Allied powers , the vast
majority in Europe . In additio n, the Allies used motion
pictures and still photog raphs, and broadc ast mediumand shortwave radio program s to the home fronts of their
enemies. On the tactical level, U.S . militar y personnel
conduc ted frontlin e radio propag anda program s and used
loudspeakers and megaph ones. Nearly every campai gn in
the Pacific and Asian theaters during World War II witnessed the use of some form of psycho logical warfare
waged by either a civilian or a militar y agency.
In contras t to Europe , however, the Pacific war represented a vastly differen t world for Allied propaganclisrs
because of the numbe r of operati onal tl1eaters in the re-

